ミハエラと申します。現在は茨城県つくば市に住んでおり、ルーマニア語/英語を教えます。また翻訳・通訳の依頼もお受けいたします。


by Mihaela_Romania
ステップ1 「日本語教育」何を、だれが、だれに、どこで、
      どのように教える?

1-1 何を?
1-2 だれが? 
1-3 だれに?どこで?
1-4 どのように?
1-5 日本語教師の資格「日本語教育能力検定試験」
1-6 日本語教師の資格「養成講座修了」


ステップ2 授業の前に-異文化理解と学習者への配慮、
      ラポール形成

2-1 異文化コミュニケーション   
2-2 教室環境の準備
2-3 ラポール形成
2-4 最初の授業で


ステップ3 学習段階

3ー1 外国語の学習段階
3-2 日本語初級、中級、上級のレベル


ステップ4 直接法による日本語教育

4-1 直接法
4-2 直接法の授業
4-3 媒介語


ステップ5 授業活動

5-1 授業の流れ
5-2 ウォーミングアップ、復習
5-3 新出項目の導入
5-4 新出項目の説明
5-5 練習(プラクティス/ドリル)
5-6 練習のまとめ


ステップ6 教室でのインターアクション

6-1 インターアクション
6-2 教室空間
6-3 教室活動


ステップ7 入門期の授業

7-1 最初の授業
7-2 日本語の発音とひらがなの読み方導入
7-3 教室用語
7-4 あいさつのことばと数字
7-5 文型と文脈(ディスコース)
7-6 日本語の基本的な構造の理解
7-7 指示詞「こ、そ、あ、ど」
7-8 初級教科書の文型提出順序


ステップ8 練習のやり方

8-1 基礎練習(文型ドリル)
8-2 一般的なドリルのやり方
8-3 反復(リピート)練習(repetition drill)
8-4 変形(転換)練習(transformation drill)
8-5 代入(置き換え)練習(substitution drill)
8-6 代入変形練習(substitution,transformation drill)
8-7 応答(QA)練習(question & answer/response drill)
8-8 拡大(拡張)練習(expansion drill)
8-9 完成練習(conpletion drill)
8-10 小会話練習(mini conversation drill)
8-11 シナリオ(役割)会話練習(scenario practice)
8-12 発展練習(創造的練習、コミュニカティブな練習)
8-13 ゲーム (game)
8-14 ロールプレイ(role play)
8-15 タスク練習 (task practice)
8-16 ディベート(debate)
8-17 プロジェクトワーク(project work)


ステップ9 コースデザイン

9-1 コースデザインとは?
9-2 コースデザイン概要
9-3 学習者の背景調査 
9-4 ニーズ分析
9-5 レディネス分析
9-6 シラバスデザイン(教授項目)
9-7 カリキュラムデザイン


ステップ10 教授法

10-1 さまざまな教授法  
10-2 オーディオリンガルメソッド
10-3 コミュニカティブアプローチ
10-4 サイレントウェイ
10-5 サジェストペディア
10-6 ナチュラルアプローチ
10-7 CLL(コミュニティ・ランゲージ・ラーニング)
10-8 TPR(トータル・フィジカル・レスポンス)


ステップ11 教材分析と教案作成 

11-1 さまざまな教科書
11-2 課の内容
11-3 授業計画(指導案/教案)
11-4 第(  )課の授業前に準備すること、もの
11-5 授業の展開例
11-6 授業計画(指導案/教案)の例


ステップ12 授業準備

12-1 指導案シュミレーションと見直し
12-2 教材教具の準備
12-3 学習者の把握

ステップ13 模擬授業・教育実習

13-1 クラスメートを学習者役に模擬授業を行う
13-2 教育実習準備
13-3 文型指導の演習

ステップ14 世界の中の日本語教師へ
[PR]
# by Mihaela_Romania | 2011-09-16 02:23 | 日本語教師
ステップ5 

授業の中では、流れにそってさまざまな活動が展開します。

5-1 授業の流れ

授業をどのように組み立て、どのような活動をしていくのか、見ていきましょう

初級の授業活動の流れ

1)ウォーミングアップ、クラスの雰囲気作り

2)前回までの復習、宿題点検

3)新しい項目の学習
   ① 新項目の提示、導入
   ② 説明、学習項目の理解
   ③ 練習(形の練習/ 文型練習)
   ④ 応用練習(コミュニカティブな練習)

4)まとめ
   ① 学習事項の確認
   ② 宿題の説明 
   ③ 次回の予告

中上級技能別授業の流れ
1)ウォーミングアップ
2)準備活動、導入、説明
3)技能別活動(聴解、作文、など)
4)まとめ


5-2 ウォーミングアップ、復習

新しい学習項目を教える前に、学習者の緊張をほぐしましょう

   教師が教室に入ったら、まず、学習者がリラックスした気持ちで授業を始められる体制を整えます。学習者が既に学んだ日本語を使って、短い会話をかわすことから始めましょう。
   学習者をリラックスさせるのが目的ですから、理解できないような難しいことを言ってしまったり、未習の単語を使わないよう、気をつけなければなりません。初級でも、動詞文を学習した後なら「○○さん、朝(昼)ご飯を食べましたか?」形容詞文を学習した後なら「いいお天気ですね」「○○さんのペンケースはきれいですね」など、既習の文型だけを使って、会話を交わすことができます。

   練習ではないので、リラックスした雰囲気で、学習者の誤用も気にせずに、教室の中に「これからいっしょに学習していこう」という気分を盛り上げるようにします。「失敗を気にしないで楽しく取り組める雰囲気」を作りましょう。

ウォーミングアップは授業冒頭、短く効果的に

   復習のために、前回習った学習項目を入れて学習者と問答してみるのも大切です。ウォーミングアップの話題から自然な流れで、前回学習した項目を確認すれば、なめらかに新しい学習項目へ入っていけます。前回の学習項目が理解されていない場合、新しい学習項目を導入しても、効果的に進めることができません。もう少し前回の復習を続けて、前回の内容に続けられるようにしましょう。


5-3 新出項目の導入

新しい学習項目を学習者に提示します

   新出の語彙、文法、表現を学習者に提示します。初級段階では、ウォーミングアップや復習から自然に新しい学習項目の導入へと進めるよう工夫します。
   既習の文型語彙だけを使ってある状況・場面を表現し、どのような状況で新出項目を使うのか紹介します。場面状況が理解できたら新出文型を提出し、絵や板書、ジェスチャー、教師の自問自答などによって文型の意味や機能を示します。

 例)「~そうです(伝聞の導入)」

  ①ウォーミングアップで天気の話題を出す。「いいお天気ですね」「雨がふっています」など。
  ②学習者に明日の天気をたずねる。学習者の答えを聞き、「新聞を見ましたか」など、天気の根拠をたずねる。
  ③教師がみたニュースの天気予報を紹介する。「私はテレビニュースで天気予報を聞きました。明日は雨が降ると言いました。」
  ④新出文型「テレビの天気予報によると、明日は雨だそうです」を提示する
⑤学習目的の明示「今日は、話を伝える言い方を練習します。私は、話を聞きました。その話を他の人に教えます。」

(導入説明について詳しくはステップ13 「文型授業の演習」を見てください。)


5-4 新出項目の説明

新出項目の機能や形の説明をします

   初級段階での「文の機能の説明」は導入部分での活動と重なる部分が多く、導入、文型の提示をしながらどのような状況で使わ
れる文型なのか説明します。初級段階では、主に活用や接続の仕方を説明します。
   上例「~そうです」の場合、様態の「~そうです」と同時期に導入されることが多いので、注意して説明します。

例)「~そうです(伝聞)」の形の説明

①動詞/イ形容詞 の辞書形(過去/非過去)・普通体+そうです
②名詞/ナ形容詞語幹 +だ/だった+そうです


5-5 練習(プラクティス/ドリル)

新出項目がコミュニケーションの中で使えるよう練習を行います

   新しい文型を実際のコミュニケーションの中で使うことができるよう、練習を行います。
   はじめに、形の練習を中心とした文型練習(パターンプラクティス)によって、言語操作がなめらかにできるようにし、次に実際のコミュニケーションで使っていけるコミュニカティブな練習を行います。
   コミュニカティブな練習には、学習者が自分自身の状況を答えられるような応答練習や、ペアやグループで役割を受け持って練習するロールプレイ練習など、いろいろな練習方法があります。ステップ7で主な練習のやり方をみておきましょう。


5-6 練習のまとめ

授業で学んだことを整理し、学習者と確認します

   その日練習したことをまとめ、実際のコミュニケーションで使うことができるよう、確認します。学習の定着をはかるために宿題が必要なときは、プリントの記入方法やドリルのやり方を説明して配布します。
   次回の学習に予習が必要なときは、テキストのどの部分を見ておくか、どの言葉を調べておくかなど、適切に指示を出します。宿題は次回必ずチェックして間違いの指摘、補足説明などを行います。

   以上見てきたように、授業活動は、始まりから終わりまで一定の流れにそって行われます。
[PR]
# by Mihaela_Romania | 2011-09-16 02:22 | LIMBA JAPONEZA
大学生における初対面会話展開パターン

-日本語母語話者同士の会話を通して-


1.はじめに


 初対面会話は人間関係構築の第一歩だと思われる。友人関係を構築できるか否かは初対面である程度決まり(Berg&Clark,1986)、また、対人関係の発展過程を考える際、最も初期の段階から相手に対する認知というものが非常に重要になっており、会話者や会話に対して好印象を抱くことと、相手の会話者との将来の関係性に対する肯定的な認知に関連がある(小川,2000)という。従って、この敏感な第一歩でどのように話すか、どんな内容のものを初対面の話題とするか、初対面の会話として何が適切で、相手に好印象を与えるかなどについて考えることが非常に重要だと思われる。

また、このような初対面としての適切さ、つまり、どのように話すか、どんな話をしたら失礼にならないか、どんな話を回避すべきかというものは、文化によってかなり違ってくるだろう。日本文化圏には日本文化圏なりの初対面会話展開パターンがあり、ほかの文化圏にもそれなりの初対面会話展開パターンがあると考えられる。従って、異文化コミュニケーションが盛んに行われる今日では、ミスコミュニケーションを避けるために、それぞれの文化圏における初対面コミュニケーションの特徴を更に知る必要があるということはもう言うまでもない。

筆者は中国文化圏出身のため、初対面会話の展開パターンにおける日中対照研究を行いたいと考えているが、今回は最初の試みとして、日本語母語話者同士の初対面会話を通して、日本文化圏の初対面会話展開パターンを探りたいと思う。


2.先行研究


 三牧(1999)では、日本人大学生の初対面会話を分析対象とし、日本語社会における話題選択スキーマの存在及び話題選択に関与する種々のストラテジーを検証した。その結果、総話題数265の95%が23話題項目、8カテゴリーに集約され、話題選択には共通性がきわめて高く、大学生初対面会話における話題選択スキーマの存在が実証された[i]。また、話題選択ストラテジーとして、選択源から(1)直前の発話を取り立てる(2)〈基本情報交換期[ii]〉で得られる情報の中から選択する(3)初対面話題選択肢リストの中から選択する、内容から(4)共通点を探索し強調する(5)相違点に関心を示す(6)危険な話題を回避するという6種類を認定した。

 また、奥山(2000)では、女子大学生による初対面会話を分析対象として、日韓対照研究を行った。この研究では、奥山(2000)は話題を属性に関する話題、つまり、「年齢、学年、居住地域、専攻などの大学生としての一人の人間に付帯する基本的な指標に関する話題」、属性から派生する話題、つまり、「属性の話題が出た後でそれに派生して出てくる話題、例えば居住地から現在地まで来た方法や所属学部の男女比などの話題」、そして非属性の話題、つまり、「属性および属性に派生する話題ではないもの、すなわち、ボーイフレンド、就職に関するいわゆる私的な話題など」という3種類に分けている。その結果、質問による属性に関する話題は日韓において相違が見られなかったが、自己開示による属性に関する話題は韓国が日本より2倍弱多かった。

 謝(2005)では、女子大学生を対象に、初対面会話の最初の5分に注目して、日中対照分析がなされている。その結果、最初の5分間には、「身上的情報」の話題がそれ以外の話題より多く取り上げられる傾向が見られた。ここでいう身上的情報の話題とは、会話参加者の名前、所属、研究テーマ、そして住まいなどに関するものを指す。

張(2006)でも、女子大学生による初対面会話の最初の5分を研究対象し、日台対照分析を行った。その結果、初対面会話の開始部の切り出し方法において、定型的な挨拶言葉[iii]はもっぱら日本グループに出現しているのに対して、開始の確認やすぐ自己紹介に入るのは台湾グループにしか現れないという違いが見られた。また、相手に求める身上的情報の内容上において、日台ともに学科、学年、名前の情報が必ず必要であるが、ただし、日本グループは名前についての情報をより重視するという傾向が観察された。

しかし、以上のような研究は10年程前の研究であったり、初対面全体会話の最初の一部しか分析していなかったりするため、今の時代にも通用できるかどうかは疑問だし、初対面会話の全体像もまだ見えないのは問題である。



3.研究課題



三牧(1999)では、話題選択の観点から、初対面会話全体を(1)基本情報交換期:「相互に関する基本的な情報を交換するステージ。自己紹介あるいは質問-応答形式による情報交換が活発に行われる」、(2)話題選択-展開期:「特定の話題を選択し展開するステージ。大話題-小話題のように下位話題を有する階層的な構造を示すことが多い」、(3)終了期:「新規話題を採用しないことを確認し、あいさつ、定型表現などを経て会話が終了するステージ」という3期に分けている。本研究はこの考え方を援用し、初対面会話の全体的な展開パターンを探るために、この3期に沿って、以下の研究課題を設定する。

RQ1.基本情報交換期において、

1-1会話がどのように切り出されるか。

1-2どんな内容の「基本情報」が交換されるか。

1-3交換された「基本情報」はどんな方法で交換され、また、それにはどのような傾向が見られるか。

RQ2.話題選択-展開期において、

2-1何が話題として選択されるか。

2-2話題選択において、どのようなストラテジーが使用されるか。

RQ3.終了期において、

3-1 終了の仕方にはどのようなタイプが見られるか。

3-2終了末段階に、どんな言語行動がみられるか。


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[i]三牧(1999)では、話題選択スキーマについて定義していないが、「文化を共有する集団には一般的あるいは典型的な知識の集合であるスキーマ(schema)が共有されると考えられているが、話題選択に関しても『初対面会話における話題選択スキーマ』が共有されている」という記述があり、また、同様の話題に共通して付加するラベルを「話題項目」と名付け、まとめられた 23話題項目をさらに内容の関連性から、大学生活、所属、住居、共通点、出身、専門、進路、受験の8種類にカテゴリー化した。この8話題カテゴリーと23話題項目合わせて、初対面話題選択肢リストと称する。

[ii]三牧(1999)では、話題選択の観点から、初対面会話全体を(1)基本情報交換期(2)話題選択-展開期(3)終了期の3期に分けている。詳しくは本研究「3.研究課題」のところをご参照。

[iii] 張(2006)では、「初めまして、どうぞよろしくお願いします」や、「おはよう(ございます)」「こんにちは」「こんばんは」などを定型的な挨拶言葉とみなしている。
[PR]
# by Mihaela_Romania | 2011-09-16 02:19

参考文献

キーワード:初対面

1.【既読】林河運(2008)「日韓初対面会話の質問による話題導入の対照研究-ポライトネスの観点から」『現代社会文化研究』41,新潟大学大学院現代社会文化研究科149-166

2.【取寄中】奥山洋子(2005)「話題導入における日韓のポライトネス・ストラテジー比較-日本と韓国の大学生初対面会話資料を中心に」『社会言語科学』8,69-81

3.【既読】中井陽子(2003)「初対面日本語会話の話題開始部/終了部において用いられる言語的要素」『早稲田大学日本語研究教育センタ-紀要』16,早稲田大学日本語研究教育センター71-95

4.【取寄中】中井陽子(2002)「初対面母語話者/非母語話者による日本語会話の話題開始部で用いられる疑問表現と会話の理解・印象の関係--フォロ-アップ・インタビュ-をもとに」『群馬大学留学生センタ-論集』2,群馬大学留学生センタ-23-38

5.【既読】三牧陽子(1999)「初対面会話における話題選択スキーマとストラテジー-大学生会話の分析」『日本語教育』103,日本語教育学会49-58

6.【既読】宇佐美まゆみ(1998)「初対面二者間会話における「ディスコース・ポライトネス」」『ヒューマンコミュニケーション研究』26,日本コミュニケ-ション学会49-61

7.【未読】宇佐美 まゆみ(1996)「初対面二者間会話における話題導入頻度と対話相手の年齢・社会的地位・性の関係について」『ことば』17,現代日本語研究会44-57

8.【既読】」楊虹(2005)「日本語母語場面の会話に見られる話題開始表現『人間文化論叢』8,お茶の水女子大学327-336

9.【未読】 西田司(1996)「初対面30分間の話題にみる日米の自己開示」『国際関係研究 国際文化編』17,日本大学国際関係学部国際関係研究所39-55

10.【既読】吉田睦(2008)「中上級日本語学習者と母語話者の談話展開 : 会話進行に伴う情報要求表現に着目して」『筑波応用言語学研究』15,139-152

11.【既読】張瑜珊(2006)「台日女子大生による初対面会話の対照分析 : 初対面会話フレ-ムの提案を目指して」『人間文化論叢』9,お茶の水女子大学 223-233

12.【既読】中井陽子(2006)「会話のフロア-における言語的/非言語的な参加態度の示し方--初対面の日本語の母語話者/非母語話者による4者間の会話の分析」『講座日本語教育』42,早稲田大学日本語研究教育センタ-25-41

13.【既読】中井陽子(2006)「日本語の会話における言語的/非言語的な参加態度の示し方-- 初対面の母語話者/非母語話者による4者間の会話の分析」『中村明教授退職記念号』『早稲田大学日本語教育研究センタ-紀要』19,79-98

14.【取寄中】ホンミンピョ(2006)「日韓両国人の言語行動の違い(2)初対面の言語行動の日韓比較」『日本語学』25,明治書院82-89

15.【既読】西田司・中山伸一・Duronto M.Particia・Nishida Tsukasa・Nakayama Shinichi・ニシダツカサ・ナカヤマシンイチ (2005)「日本に於ける日本人の初対面の人々とのコミュニケ-ションに関する研究」『図書館情報メディア研究』2,「図書館情報メディア研究」編集委員会1-12

16.【未読】木林理恵・Xie Yun(2004)「「意見を言う」談話に関する一考察--初対面2者間会話における談話例を中心に」『外国語教育研究』7,外国語教育学会49-64

17.【取寄中】金珍娥(2003)「"turn-takingシステム"から"turn-exchangingシステム"へ--韓国語と日本語における談話構造:初対面二者間の会話を中心に」『朝鮮学報』187,朝鮮学会47-82

18.【未読】三牧陽子(2002)「待遇レベル管理からみた日本語母語話者間のポライトネス表示--初対面会話における「社会的規範」と「個人のストラテジー」を中心に」『社会言語科学』5,社会言語科学会56-74

19.【既読】町田佳世子(2002)「初対面の会話における発話の重なりの効果」『北海道東海大学紀要』15,北海道東海大学189-210

20.【既読】小川一美(2000)「初対面場面における二者間の発話量のつりあいと会話者および会話に対する印象の関係」『名古屋大学大学院教育発達科学研究科紀要』47,名古屋大学173-183

21.【未読】末田美香子(2000)「初対面場面における不同意表明と調整のストラテジ-」『日本語教育論集』16,国立国語研究所日本語教育センタ-23-46

22.【未読】窪田彩子(2000)「日本語学習者の相づちの習得-日本人との初対面における会話資料を基に」『南山日本語教育』7,76-114

23.【取寄中】宇佐美まゆみ(1993)「初対面2者間会話における会話のストラテジ-の分析--対話相手に応じた使い分けという観点から」『学苑』647,昭和女子大学近代文化研究所37-47

24.【取寄中】宇佐美まゆみ(1993)「初対面の二者間の会話の構造と話者による会話のストラテジ- : 話者間の力関係による相違--日本語の場合」『ヒュ-マンコミュニケ-ション研究』 21,日本コミュニケ-ション学会25-40

25.【取寄中】西郡仁朗 (1997)「外国人と日本人の初対面会話の分析-数量的に見た特徴と印象の形成について」『日本人の談話行動のスクリプト・ストラテジ-の研究とマルチメディア教材の試作 平成7年度~8年度文部科学省科学研究費基盤研究(C)(2)研究成果報告書』 58-74

26.【取寄中】西郡仁朗・宇佐美まゆみ(1996)「外国人と日本人の初対面会話の分析-相手への印象に影響を及ぼす要因」『日本語教育学会1996秋季大会予稿集』,202-07

27.【取寄中】宇佐美まゆみ・西郡仁朗 (1996)「日本人の初対面二者間会話の分析-外国人と日本人のコミュニケ-ション教育のための基礎研究」『日本語教育学会1996 年度秋期大会予稿集』,196-201


キーワード:話題

28.【
取寄中】宇佐美まゆみ・嶺田明美(1995)「対話相手に応じた話題導入の仕方とその展開パタ-ン:話者間の力関係による相違--日本語の場合」『日本語学・日本語教育論集』2,名古屋学院留学生別科130-145 

29.【取寄中】加藤好崇 (2006)「接触場面における文体・話題の社会言語規範」『東海大学留学生教育センタ-紀要』25, 1-18

30.【取寄中】加藤好崇 (2006)「日本国内と中国国内における日本語接触場面:話題の規範について」『第7回国際日本研究・日本語教育シンポジウム予稿集』,香港中文大学114-19

31.【取寄中】熊谷智子・石井恵理子 (2005)「会話における話題の選択-若年層を中心とする日本人と韓国人への調査から-」『社会言語科学』8, 93-105



キーワード:接触場面

32.【未読】フェアブラザー・L. C. (2002)「相手言語接触場面における日本語母語話者の規範適用メカニズム 接触場面における言語管理プロセスについて(Ⅱ)」『社会文化科学研究科研究プロジェクト報告書』38,1-12

33.【未読】ファン・ S. K. (1999)「非母語話者同士の日本語会話における言語問題」『社会言語科学』2-1, 37-48

34.【未読】ファン・S. K. (2002)「対象者の内省を調査する(1)フォロ-アップ・インタビュー」『言語研究の方法:言語学・日本語学・日本語教育学に携わる人のために 』,くろしお出版87-96

35.【未読】ファン・ S. K. (2006)「接触場面のタイポロジーと接触場面研究の課題」『日本語教育の新たな文脈-学習環境 接触場面 コミュニケ-ションの多様性-』,アルク120−41

36.【未読】鎌田修 (2003)「接触場面の教材化」『接触場面と日本語教育 ネウストプニーのインパクト』, 明治書院353−69

37.【未読】加藤好崇(2005)「接触場面における社会言語的行動規定(規範)」『第15回社会言語科

学会大会予稿集』206-209

38.【未読】加藤好崇 (2006) 「接触場面における規範の考察」『高見澤孟先生古希記念論文集』,高見澤孟先生古希記念論集編集委員会48-58

39.【未読】泉子・Kメイナード(1994)「日米会話におけるテーマ転換のストラテジー」『会話分析』,くろしお出版139-151

40.【未読】高民定 (2003)「接触場面におけるカテゴリー化と権力」『接触場面と日本語教育-ネウストプニーのインパクト』,明治書院59-68

41.【未読】高民定 (2006)「文法能力の規範についての一考察-接触場面の受け身の生成を中心に」『多文化共生社会における言語管理接触場面の言語管理研究』4, 91-102

42.【未読】Marriott(2003)『接触場面と日本語教育-ネウストプニーのインパクト』,明治書院113-42

43.【未読】村岡英裕 (2004)「フォローアップ・インタビューにおける質問と応答」『接触場面の言語管理研究』3, 209-226

キーワード:会話分析理論

44.【未読】山崎敬一・鈴木栄幸・小山慎哉・葛岡英明(1999)「 特集;ディスコ-ス研究の射程で 会話分析とテクノロジ-分析-エスノメソドロジ-とディスコ-スの研究」『言語』

45.【既読】橋内武(2003)『ディスコース-談話の織りなす世界』くろしお出版

46.【未読】泉子・K・メイナ-ド(1997)『談話分析の可能性-理論・方法・日本語の表現性』くろしお出版

47.【既読】ネストプニ-・ J. V.・宮崎里司 (2002)『言語研究の方法-言語学・日本語学・日本語教育学に携わる人のために』くろしお出版

48.【既読】滝浦真人(2008)『ポライトネス入門』研究社

49.【既読】佐藤慎司(2008)『文化、ことば、教育』明石書店

50.【未読】鈴木聡志(2007)『ディスコ-ス分析-ことばの織りなす世界を読み解く』新曜社

51.【既読】マイケル・マッカ-シー(1995)『語学教師のための談話分析』大修館書店

52.【既読】メイナ-ド(1993)『日英語対照研究シリーズ2 会話分析』くろしお出版

53.【未読】大原由美子(2007)『日本語ディスコ-スへの多様なアプローチ-会話分析・談話分析・クリティカル談話分析』凡人社

54.【未読】掘口純子(1997) 『日本語教育と会話分析 Japanese Conversation by Learners and Nat』くろしお出版

55.【未読】前田泰樹(2007)『エスノメソドロジ--人びとの実践から学ぶ』新曜社

55.【未読】佐藤郁哉(2008)『質的デ-タ分析法-原理・方法・実践 (単行本)』新曜社

56.【未読】Grice・H .P. (1975) Logic and Conversation. In C. P., & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax andsemantics 3 : Speech acts,New York: Academic 41-58

57.【未読】Nekvapil,・J. & Neustupný,・J. V. (2005) Politeness in the Czech Republic: Distance,Levels of Expression, Management and Intercultural Contact. In L. Hickey, & M.Stewart (Eds.), Politeness in Europe,Multilingual Matters Ltd 247-62
[PR]
# by Mihaela_Romania | 2011-09-16 02:11 | LIMBA JAPONEZA

不定冠詞 un (baiat)/ o (fata)



早速ですが、ルーマニア語のレッスンを始めたいと思います。
まず、名詞に前に付く不定冠詞についてです。

不定冠詞って、英語の不定冠詞「a(an)」と同じもので、必ず名詞の前に付きます。

英語の名詞には性がないのでa(an)でOKなのですが、ルーマニア語の名詞は男性、中性、女性があるので不定冠詞は性に合わせなきゃいけないんですよね。。。

でもそんなに難しくはないと思うから、肩の力を抜いていうー!
ルー語の不定冠詞はウノ!
uno!un・o!uno

男性と中性には「un」、女性には「」が付きます。

男 un caine(=a dog) 
中 un tren(=a train) 
女 o camera(=a room) 

とまぁこんな風になるんだよん~~


[PR]
# by mihaela_romania | 2011-03-08 22:22 | ルーマニア語

新ルーマニア語教室



去年の4月から筑波大学に研究生として留学し、今年の2月に大学院を受験し、合格しました!
そんなわけで、来る4月から大学院生としての生活が始まります!

院生の勉強と兼ねて、ルーマニア語会話教室を開くことになりました!!

ご興味のある方、パソコンやインターネットさえあれば、Skypeを通して(カメラ・マイクも必要)ビィデオ通話で授業を受けられます。

私のSkype名はmihaela_butnariuです。気軽に連絡してください!


東京方面に住んでいらっしゃる方は、直接お会いして、授業を行います!

宜しくお願いします。


[PR]
# by mihaela_romania | 2011-03-08 21:48 | LIMBA JAPONEZA

The debate over the performance model flared up because it started affecting the elite sector; ‘Japanese-style’ management has never applied to small businesses which adjust their employment structure according to economic fluctuations, with workers moving from one company to another with considerable frequency. An increasing number of non-regular workers, those part-timers and casuals with no long-term employment base, are hired and fired depending upon performance and output. One should, therefore, examine the debate over the competing models of work with a conscious focus on the lower end of the labor-force hierarchy.

Cultural Capitalism: An Emerging Mega-sector

Culture has become big business around the world with advanced economies increasingly dominated by the information, education, medicine, welfare and other cultural industries that specialize in the world of symbols, images and representations. Japan’s capitalism has been at the forefront in this area by producing fresh value-added commodities in the face of growing competition from Asian countries to which the centers of industrial production had shifted. No longer the manufacturing powerhouse of the world, Japanese capitalism has carved out new and enormous markets through expertise in the worlds of software technology, visual media, music, entertainment, hospitality and leisure. In these fields, Japanese companies continue to hold comparative advantage and claim international superiority, thereby releasing a constant stream of cultural products into the global market and reshaping the Japanese economy.

One may argue that Japan has now developed cultural capitalism, which relies upon the production of symbols, knowledge and information as the guiding principle of wealth creation and focuses upon cultural attractions and activities as the primary motivating factors underpinning consumption. The debate over ‘soft power’ and ‘Japan Cool’ has arisen in this context. To provide a map of the comparative features of emerging cultural capitalism as distinguished from conventional industrial capitalism, Table 2 contrasts the modus operandi of the two types of capitalism in existence today. It should be stressed that the features in the cells do not denote exclusive properties of each type but exhibit the relative points of emphasis of the two for comparative purposes.

As early as the 1980s, market analysts were quick to point out that the patterns of Japanese consumer behavior were becoming diversified in a fundamental way. Previously, manufacturers sold models standardized for mass consumption, successfully promoting them through sales campaigns and advertisements. Recently, however, this strategy has become ineffective as consumers have begun to seek products in tune with their personal preferences. They have become more unpredictable, selective, and inquisitive. The notion of the Japanese as uniform mass consumers does not effectively account for their consumer behavior patterns today. A consumer behavior study21 suggested the emergence of shōshū – individualized, divided, and small-unit masses – as opposed to taishū, the undifferentiated, uniform, and large-scale mass. The research institute of Hakuhōdō,22 a leading advertising agency, also argued that the notion of bunshū (segmented masses) would account for the behavior of consumers more effectively than the conventional view of them as a homogeneous entity. In short, cultural capitalism thrives with mass customization, the production of many different commodities tailored for specific focus groups, unlike industrial capitalism that is built upon the mass production of a small number of standardized goods. If industrial capitalism survives on the relative homogeneity of consumer lifestyles, cultural capitalism rests upon their differentiation. Mobile phones, for instance, are frequently revamped with different functions, designs and colors, fashioned to fulfill the distinct desires of particular and shifting demographics.

Contents of takeout box lunches sold to office workers at convenience stores are highly varied to satisfy the diverse tastes of youngsters, women, middle-aged men and other socio-economic groups.

Such differentiation of consumer motivations mirrors alterations in the criteria of class formation. Hara and Seiyama, leading experts in social stratification, argue that inequality has been removed in contemporary ‘affluent’ Japan as far as ‘basic goods’ are concerned, while the nation is increasingly stratified in pursuit of what they call ‘upper goods.’23 Absolute poverty was eradicated when the population’s subsistence needs were met. Almost every household can now afford a television set, telephone, car, rice cooker and other essential goods for a comfortable daily life. Virtually all teenagers advance to senior high school and fulfill their basic educational requisites. In the meantime, community perceptions of social stratification are becoming multi-dimensional. The different sectors of the Japanese population are increasingly divergent in their respective evaluations of status indicators. Some attach importance to asset accumulation, while others regard occupational kudos as crucial. Still others would deem quality of life the most significant dimension. In each sphere, what Hara and Seiyama call ‘upper goods’ are scarce, be they luxury housing, postgraduate education or deluxe holidays, with these expensive commodities being beyond the reach of many people. Thus, social divisions in Japanese society today derive not so much from the unequal distribution of commonplace and mundane industrial goods as from that of prestigious and stylish cultural goods.

It is an established convention to divide economies into three sectors of activity: the primary sector (including agriculture and fisheries) which transforms natural resources into products, the secondary sector (comprising manufacturing and construction) which produces finished goods from the output of the primary sector, and the tertiary sector which offers services or intangible goods and encompasses industries ranging from retail, wholesale, finance and real estate to the public service. Given that some 70 percent of workers in Japan are now employed in the tertiary sector,24 this sector needs reclassification according to internal varieties. Specifically, the recent expansion of areas that make knowledge-based, informational and value-added products form what may be categorized as the quaternary sector which branches off from the conventional tertiary sector. Though no governmental statistics are based on such category, on a rough and conservative estimate, approximately one quarter of Japan’s workforce operates in this sphere, ranging from employees in the information and telecommunications industries, medical, health care and welfare sectors, restaurants, hotels and other leisure businesses to education and teaching support staff, and government workers. As Table 3 suggests, the number of employees engaged in the quaternary sector is on par with that of those in the manufacturing and construction industries that are typically classified as the secondary sector. These figures are admittedly very crude approximations.25 Nevertheless, broadly speaking, cultural workers undoubtedly predominate as much as industrial workers in the landscape of Japan’s workforce today.

In tandem with these domestic shifts, Japan is now seen internationally as a superpower in terms of cultural ‘soft power’ that exercises a significant influence around the world in various areas of popular culture, including computer games, pop music, fashion, architecture, not to mention manga and anime. In the field of education, the Kumon method which has spread across at least forty four countries and territories uses special methods to tutor children in a variety of subjects. In music, the Suzuki method is marketed as a unique and special approach to enhance musical talent. Even in sushi restaurants, Japanese cuisine techniques constitute the core of business activity.

Nintendo is now a household name around the world, and computer games made in Japan enjoy immense popularity. So do Sudoku puzzles initially actively commercialized in Japan. These developments reflect the sharp edges of the emerging international division of labor in which the production of cultural goods occupies a crucial position in advanced economies in general and Japanese capitalism in particular.

All this signifies that the knowledge-intensive skills that are based on exclusive patents, copyrights and intellectual properties take on increasingly profound significance and attach greater significance to the cultural dimensions of production.

Cultural capitalism goes hand in hand with cultural nationalism. Japan’s state machinery regards the expansion of its cultural capitalism as a global strategy to enhance the nation’s position in the international hierarchy. In particular, the popularity of Japanese cultural goods has a special meaning in Asia where competing historical interpretations of World War II still cause contention. Even though memories of the past and the cultural trade of the present are two separate dimensions, it is a part of the master plan of the Japanese state that the prevailing popular image of Japanese cultural commodities in Asia will aid Japan as a nation in gaining general acceptance in the region in the long run. The notion that Japan as the most advanced country in Asia should lead other nations in the region concurs with the worldview of the Japanese establishment, even though the idea sometimes conjures up the wartime Japanese ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

It is also worth noting here that an increasing number of workers in the cultural sector, if not all, can produce their commodities without being bound to a particular physical place of work. If industrial capitalism originated from the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, cultural capitalism exploded with the Information Revolution in the late twentieth century, accompanied by the sudden expansion of the internet and the proliferation of mobile phones. Cyberspace technology enables cultural workers to be de-localized, and this tends to facilitate the above-mentioned casualization of employment. At the same time, the creative expertise of cultural products can easily be copied without authorization and pirated inter-territorially. To confront the situation, the ‘Basic Law of Intellectual Properties’ was enacted in 2002 to safeguard not only Japanese patents but also the nation’s contents industry that produces original texts, images, movies, music and other creative data, while strict state regulation of cyberspace continues to be a near impossibility.

In this environment, workers become fragmented, with their work life becoming increasingly compartmentalized. Labor unions which used to be the bastion of worker solidarity have gradually lost membership and power, and individual employees attempt to defend themselves by being self-centered, resourceful and entrepreneurial. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Japanese are concerned less with the survival and subsistence issues that govern industrial capitalism and more with the precariousness of their sense of identity and reality, the existential issues that characterize cultural capitalism. This trend forms a backdrop against which people attempt to carve out a new form of community in expanding civil society.26

References

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Chiavacci, David 2008, ‘From class struggle to general middle-class society to divided society: Models of inequality in postwar Japan’, Social Science Japan Journal, vol. 11, no. 1: 5–27.

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Fujita, Wakao 1984, Sayonara, taishū (A farewell to masses). Kyoto: PHP Kenkyūsho.

Hakuhōdō Seikatsu Sōgō Kenkyūsho 1985, ‘Bunshū’ no tanjō (The emergence of segmented masses). Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.

Hara, Junsuke and Seiyama, Kazuo 2006, Inequality amid Affluence: Social Stratification in Japan. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Ishida, Hiroshi 2010, ‘Does class matter in Japan?’, in Hiroshi Ishida and David H. Slater (eds), Social Class in Japan, London: Routledge, pp. 33–56.

Kenessey, Zoltan 1987, ‘The primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary sectors of the economy,’ Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 33, issue 4: 359–85.

Kōsei Rōdōshō (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) 2006, Heisei 18-nenban rōdō keizai no bunseki (Analysis of labor economics, 2006).

Kosugi, Reiko 2008, Escape from Work: Freelancing Youth and the Challenge to Corporate Japan. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Morioka, Kōji 2009, Hinkonka suru howaito karā (The impoverished white collar). Chikuma Shobō.

NHK Special ‘Working Poor’ Shuzai-han 2007, Working Poor: Nippon o mushibamu yamai (The working poor: the dicease that gnaws away at Japan). Popla-sha.

Satō, Toshiki 2000, Fubyōdō shakai Nippon (Japan: Not an egalitarian society). Chūō Kōronsha.

Shirase, Sawako 2010, ‘Marriage as an association of social classes in a low fertility rate society, Hiroshi Ishida and David H. Slater (eds), Social Class in Contemporary Japan. London: Routledge, pp. 57–83.

Tachibanaki, Toshiaki 2005, Confronting Income Inequality in Japan: A Comparative Analysis of Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūsho (Institute of Statistical Mathematics) 2009, ‘Kokumin-sei no kenkyū: 2008-nen dai 12-kai zenkoku chōsa’ (Studies of national character: the 12th national survey, conducted in 2008). Tōkei Chōsa Kenkyō Report.



Yoshio Sugimoto is Emeritus Professor of Sociology, La Trobe University and Director, Trans Pacific Press Pty Ltd

He drew on material from his Introduction to Japanese Society to prepare this article.

His Recent books include An Introduction to Japanese Society, third edition (2010) and The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture (2009).

Recommended citation:Yoshio SUGIMOTO, "Class and Work in Cultural Capitalism: Japanese Trends," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 40-1-10, October 4, 2010.


Articles on related subjects:

Nobuko Adachi, Ethnic Identity, Culture, and Race: Japanese and Nikkei at Home and Abroad

Stephanie Assmann and Sebastian Maslow, Dispatched and Displaced: Rethinking Employment and Welfare Protection in Japan

David H. Slater, The Making of Japan's New Working Class: "Freeters" and the Progression From Middle School to the Labor Market

Recommended citation: Yoshio Sugimoto, "Class and Work in Cultural Capitalism: Japanese Trends," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 40-1-10, October 4, 2010.

Notes

1 This article is based on material drawn from An Introduction to Japanese Society, third edition (Cambridge University Press 2010) and submitted at the invitation of Japan Focus.

2 For an excellent analysis of the paradigm change, see Chiavacci 2008.

3 Satō 2000 initiated the debate.

4 Tachibanaki 2005 is one of the best studies in the area.

5 Shirahase 2010.

6 Tokyo Daigaku Kōhō Iinkai 2008. The data were gathered in 2007.

7 Japan’s relative poverty rate, an indicator of the percentage of low-income earners, was 14.9 percent in 2004, the fourth highest among the OECD’s thirty member nations, and rose to 15.7 percent in 2007. The relative poverty rate represents the percentage of income earners whose wage is below half of the median income.

8 See Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūsho 2009, Table 1.8.

9 See Ishida 2010.

10 The total index of structural mobility records a consistent upward trend throughout the postwar years. The agricultural population provides the only exception to this propensity, showing a consistent downward trend. The total index arrived at its peak in 1975, reflecting a massive structural transformation which transpired during the so-called high-growth period starting in the mid 1960s.

11 Morioka 2009.

12 Satō 2000. Some experts dispute this thesis. See, for example, Hara and Seiyama 2005, pp. xxiii–vi.

13 Chūō Kōron Henshūbu and Nakai 2003.

14 The Labor Force Survey conducted in 2008 by the Ministry of Welfare, Labor and Health.

15 See NHK Special 2007.

16 For details, see Kosugi 2008.

17 Asahi Shimbun ‘Lost Generation’ Shuzai-han 2007.

18 Kōsei Rōdōshō 2006. The figures are calculated from data collected in 2002.

19 Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūsho 2009, Table 5.6. In the 2008 survey, 81 percent support the former type and 15 the latter.

20 Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūsho 2009, Table 5.6b. Both in 2003 and 2008, the figures were 53 percent versus 44 percent.

21 Fujita 1984.

22 Hakuhōdō 1985.

23 This is a major theme of Hara and Seiyama 2005. See pp. 164–7 in particular.

24 Labor Force Survey in 2007, conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

25 The so-called ‘compound’ and ‘other’ service industries include cultural enterprises, such as ‘political, business and cultural organizations’ and ‘religion.’ Some researchers of the quaternary sector – such as Kenessey 1987 – include ‘real estate’ in this sector. Our approximation here is quite conservative, and we simply wish to show that the quaternary sector now forms an independent, expanding and sufficiently large sector in its own right.

26 The thesis is examined in Chapter 10 of the book
[PR]
# by mihaela_romania | 2010-11-19 01:53
Yoshio Sugimoto, "Class and Work in Cultural Capitalism: Japanese Trends," 1 The Asia-Pacific Journal, 40-1-10, October 4, 2010.

Paradigm Shift: From Homogenous to Class-divided Society

A dramatic paradigm shift appears to be underway in contemporary Japanese society, with public discourse suddenly focusing upon internal divisions and variations in the population. At the beginning of the 21st century, the nation has observed a drastic shift in its characterization from a uniquely homogeneous and uniform society to one of domestic diversity, class differentiation and other multidimensional forms. The view that Japan is a monocultural society with little internal cultural divergence and stratification, which was once taken for granted, is now losing monopoly over the way Japanese society is portrayed.2 The emerging discourse argues that Japan is a kakusa shakai, literally a ‘disparity society’, a socially divided society with sharp class differences and glaring inequality. The view appears to have gained ground during Japan’s prolonged recession in the 1990s, the so-called lost decade, and in the 2000s when the country experienced a further downturn as a consequence of the global financial crisis.

The new image of Japan as a class-divided and unequal society has resulted not so much from intellectual criticisms levelled at the once dominant model as from public perceptions of changing patterns of the labor market. In mass media, on one end of the spectrum, the new rich who have almost instantly amassed vast wealth in such areas as information technology, new media and financial manipulation are celebrated and lionized as fresh billionaires.

At the other end of the spectrum are the unemployed, the homeless, day laborers and other marginalized members of society who are said to form karyū shakai (the underclass), revealing a discrepancy which gives considerable plausibility to the imagery of class-divided society.

At the heart of the controversy is job stability which used to be the hallmark of Japan’s labor market. One out of three employees are now ‘non-regular workers’ whose employment status is precarious. Even ‘regular’ employees who were guaranteed job security throughout their occupational careers have been thrown out of employment because of their companies’ poor business outcomes and the unsatisfactory performance of their own work. Moreover, in regional economic comparisons, affluent metropolitan lifestyles often appear in sharp contrast with the deteriorated and declining conditions of rural areas.

Reflecting these developments, scholarly class analysis has attained center stage in public discussion. In sociology, debate continues to rage over the extent to which social mobility to the privileged upper middle white-collar sector Japan has declined.3 In labor economics, many researchers focus their attention on how Japan’s level of social inequality – measured by the Gini index – compares with those of other developed societies.4 In family sociology, empirical studies show that intra-class marriages within identical occupational and educational categories remain predominant, and ‘ascriptive homogamy’ is most robust among university graduates, with inter-generational class continuity enduring most firmly in most educated strata of Japanese society.5 In the field of education, about three quarters of the students of the University of Tokyo, the most prestigious university in Japan, are the sons and daughters of company managers, bureaucrats, academics, teachers and professionals.6 In poverty studies, one in seven workers is estimated to live under the poverty line in Japan,7 a condition that hardly makes the country a ‘homogeneous middle-class society.’

Still, a sobering reality prevails. Despite the claim of the emergence of kakusa shakai, an overwhelming majority of Japanese continue to regard themselves as belonging to the ‘middle class,’ a pattern that has persisted for decades.8 Yet, as Table 1 shows, comparative studies of class affiliation in a number of nations found that 80–90 percent of people identify themselves as ‘middle class,’ which suggests that this phenomenon is far from being unique to Japan.

Debate and Caution about the Kakusa Society Thesis

While gaining broad acceptance, the so-called kakusa society thesis has been subject to animated debate and must be examined with caution.

First of all, the assertion that Japanese society has suddenly become a kakusa society raises much skepticism. There is much well founded argument that Japan has always been a class-divided and stratified society and was never a uniquely ‘middle-class society’ as described by the Nihonjinron model. From this perspective, an abrupt shift took place in public awareness and sensitivity, not in empirical substance and reality. Even at the prime of the ‘uniquely egalitarian society’ argument, numerous studies demonstrated that such claim may represent only the tatemae side of Japanese society. Some comparative quantitative studies suggest that Japanese patterns of socioeconomic inequality show no systematic deviance from those of other countries of advanced capitalism. The overall social mobility rate in Japan is basically similar to patterns observed in other industrialized societies.9

The second proviso bears upon the optical illusion that appears to have persisted during the high economic growth era. There is no doubt that the high-growth economy of postwar Japan led to changes in the occupational composition of the population and shifted large numbers from agriculture to manufacturing, from blue-collar to white-collar, from manual to non-manual, and from low-level to high-level education.10 However, this transfiguration left a false impression – as though industrialization were conducive to a high measure of upward social mobility. In reality, the relative positions of various strata in the hierarchy remained unaltered. For example, the educational system which produced an increasing number of university graduates cheapened the relative value of degrees and qualifications. To put it differently, when everyone stands still on an ascending escalator, their relative positions remain unaltered even though they all go up. A sense of upward relative mobility in this case is simply an illusion. When the escalator stops or slows down, it becomes difficult for the illusion to be sustained. The occupational system cannot continue to provide ostensibly high-status positions, and eventually it must be revealed that some of the social mobility of the past was in fact due to the inflationary supply of positions. This is exactly what many in the labor force began to feel when Japan’s economy came to a standstill, recording negative growth in the 1990s and entering into a deflationary spiral in the early 2000s. The reality of class competition began to bite only when the economic slowdown failed to discernibly enlarge the total available pie.

Third, a widening gap between haves and have-nots may be exaggerated because of the increase in the proportion of the aged in the population. Since social disparities are the largest among senior citizens, an aging society tends to show a greater chasm between the rich and the poor. The demographic transformation towards a greying society overstates the general levels of class differentiation of the total population.

Fourth, Japan’s socio-economic disparities were accelerated not only by unorganized structural transformations but by deliberately engineered policy changes in the taxation system. They have decreased the rate of progressive taxation with the result that its redistribution functions have been weakened. For one thing, the consumption taxation scheme was put into motion in 1989, making it necessary for each consumer to pay five percent of the price of purchased goods as sales tax. This system benefits the wealthy and harms the poor, because the consumption tax is imposed on all consumers in the same way regardless of their incomes and assets. Further, the reduction of the inheritance tax rate in 2003 has lessened the burdens of asset owners in the intergenerational transfer of ownership. This advantaged the relatively rich and enhanced class discrepancies in this area.

Finally, one would have to see the perception shift in class structure in Japan from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Apparent or real, recent changes in class situations took place close to the everyday life of opinion makers and data analysts. Even when economic hardship and class competition were daily realities in the lower echelons of Japanese society, many of these commentators paid little heed to the issue because they occupied privileged positions distant from the lower levels of social stratification. However, their perceptions began to alter with the shifting class structure affecting their acquaintances and friends in their networks as a consequence of the economic stagnation and downturn in the 1990s and 2000s. The job security of full-time employees in the elite track of large companies is now at risk.11 The upper white-collar employees, a category that comprises managers and professionals, are an increasingly closed group which the children of other social strata find it difficult to break into.12 A decline in scholastic achievements even among the pupils of the upper middle classes and above has aroused concern among parents.13 There are grounds to suspect that the class position of ‘class observers’ influences their sensitivity to stratificational divisions in Japanese society.

Job Market Rationalization

The world of employment constitutes the center of debate about class and inequality in contemporary Japan. While the familial and paternalistic ‘Japanese-style’ model remains entrenched in Japan’s work culture, the prolonged recession of the 1990s and the subsequent penetration of globalizing forces into the Japanese economy has seen two fundamental shifts in the system of work – the casualization of the workforce and the introduction of performance-based employment.

Casualization of Labor

The first distinctive trend is the casualization of the labor force, a development that has been deemed a major factor that has contributed to the widening inequality between social classes. The restructuring that many companies launched in the face of the sluggish economy produced a growing number of part-time and casual workers and sharpened the line of demarcation between regular employees (seishain) and non-regular employees (hi-seishain). Regular employees encompass the full-time salaried workers who enjoy various company benefits, with many relishing the privilege of ‘lifetime employment.’ Non-regular employees include a variety of impermanent workers with disposable employment status and unstable wage structure. With economic rationalism forcing managers to minimize the costs of employment, approximately seventeen million workers, one out of three employees, now fall into the category of non-regular employees.14 It is estimated that more than half of working women and two out of five young employees belong to this group. Many of these non-regular workers form the ‘working poor,’15 a class of individuals who attempt to work hard in vulnerable jobs but are unable to get out of the cycle of underemployment and undersubsistence. Because of their vulnerable positions, many of them submit tamely to this condition and fail to demonstrate their dissatisfaction openly for fear of their employers refusing to renew their existing contract.

These marginalized employees comprise a few subcategories, some of which overlap with each other. The first of these are made up of the so-called part-time workers. Though classified as part-timers, many in this group work for thirty hours a week and differ little from full-time regular employees in terms of working hours and the substance of the jobs they perform. Married women who work to help support family finances far outnumber other types of part-timers. Generally, these ‘full-time part-timers’ receive low hourly wages, stay in the same position for years without career prospects and rarely have the privilege of joining the employee welfare pension system to which employers make contributions.

The second subcategory consists of those who engage in arubaito, a Japanese term derived from the German, which includes a variety of side jobs. Many students do after-school or vacation jobs to cover the costs of their school life. Moonlighters who earn extra money from casual jobs also belong to this category. While part-timers normally designates simply those who work less than full-time, most of those who perform arubaito are regarded as having full-time work (including schoolwork).

In popular parlance, the term friiter (freeter) is an established classification that combines these two subcategories (though excludes married female part-timers) and signifies those young workers who are ostensibly willing to engage in casual work on their own volition. The term comes from the English word free combined with part of the German term Arbeiter (people who work) and invokes the image of free-floating and unencumbered youths who work on and off based on their independent will, though the reality behind this image is highly complex.16 Many are the so-called ‘moratorium type’ youths who are buying time against the day when they could obtain better employment status, after dropping out of either school or other work without clear plans for their future. Some set their sights on being hired as regular employees despite the diminishment of these posts over time. Others accept casual work in the hope of obtaining ‘cultural’ jobs in the arts or doing skilled craftwork, though paths to long-term employment in such areas are narrow and limited. Still others simply drift in the casual job market, living week by week or month by month, with no aspirations for their future life course.

There are also other forms of non-regular workers, including contract employees (keiyaku shain) who are employed in the same way as regular workers only for a specified contract period; temporary workers (haken shain) who are dispatched from private personnel placement agencies; and part-time employees who work for a few years after retirement under a new contract (shokutaku shain).

These non-regular workers are now firmly embedded into the Japanese economy which cannot now function without their services. They are quite noticeable in Japan’s highly efficient and fast-paced urban life, at the counters of convenience shops and petrol stations and in fast-food restaurants, some of which are open twenty-four hours a day. One can also observe many non-regular workers among middle-aged female shop assistants in supermarkets, elderly security guards at banks and young parcel-delivery workers from distribution companies.

The casualization of employment poses a particularly serious issue to workers in the prime of their working lives. Those between twenty five and thirty five years of age, who entered the job market during Japan’s ‘lost decade’ in the 1990s, form the nation’s ‘lost generation’17 and constitute the bulk of non-regular workers. Without having much hope for the future, some drift into the life pattern of the so-called NEET, youth who are never educated, employed or vocationally trained. It is telling that, among males in their early thirties (30–34 of age), only 30 percent of non-regular workers are married, half the rate of regular workers (59 percent).18

Performance-based Model

The second emerging trend that departs from the conventional internal labor market model is the rise of new work arrangements, in which short-term employer evaluations of an employees’ market value and job performance form the key criteria determining remuneration and the continuation of employment. Some enterprises have started to offer large salaries to employees with special professional skills and achievements while not ensuring job security.

These companies no longer take years of service as a yardstick for promotion and wage rise and have thus opened ways for high achievers to be rewarded with high positions and exceptional salaries regardless of age or experience. Under this scheme, many employees opt for the annual salary system and receive yearly sums and large bonuses subject to their achievement of pre-set goals. Their job security would be at risk if they failed to meet the set targets. It has been argued that this system provides good incentives to ambitious individuals and motivates them to accomplish work in a focused and productive manner. Though not representative of a majority, a few bright success stories of high flyers who have chosen this path are splashed in the mass media from time to time. Head-hunting and mid-career recruitment became rampant among high flying business professionals in the elite sector.

While an increasing number of large corporations adopt the performance-first principle in one way or another, the number of employees who elect the annual salary system remains a minority. On the whole, this form of employment is more widespread in the service sector than in the manufacturing industry.

The performance model has been subject to criticism in many respects. The system, in reality, requires employees to work inordinately long hours without overtime for the attainment of set goals and thereby enables management to pay less per unit of time and reduces the total salary costs of the company. It has also been pointed out that the introduction of the annual salary system not only creates two groups of employees in an enterprise but also enhances the level of intra-company social disparity and reduces team work and morale. At issue also is the transparency of the evaluation process regarding the degree to which pre-arranged goals have been attained. While advocates of the performance model contend that the scheme is in line with globally accepted business practice, ‘Japanese-style’ management proponents maintain that it is predicated upon the principle of the survival of the fittest, a doctrine detrimental to the general wellbeing of employees. Even in the late 2000s, in the sphere of value orientation, the paternalistic ‘Japanese-style’ management model appears to have robust support among Japanese workers: national random surveys conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics have consistently shown for more than half a century that ‘a supervisor who is overly demanding at work but is willing to listen to personal problems and is concerned with the welfare of workers’ is preferred to ‘one who is not so strict on the job but leaves the worker alone and does not involve himself with their personal matters.’19 Likewise, a larger proportion of the Japanese populace would prefer to work in a company with recreational activities like field days and leisure outings for employees despite relatively low wages, rather than in one with high wages without such a family-like atmosphere.20

It should be reiterated that the beneficiaries of lifetime employment, seniority-based wages and enterprise unionism have been limited in practice to the core employees of large companies, a quarter of the total workforce at most. Inter-company mobility and performance-based wage structures had been prevalent in small firms and among non-core workers, though neither was quite visible nor controversial during the high growth period because every worker’s labor conditions appeared to be improving at least on the surface.
[PR]
# by mihaela_romania | 2010-11-19 01:49

正義感と責任感

正義感と責任感。
言うまでもなく、これらは人間にとって非常に重要なことです。
正義感のない人は、自分が得をするためなら「悪いことをしても、
見つからなければよい」と考え、利己的になりがちです。

また、責任感のない人は、自分を守ること、面倒から逃げることばかり考え、
自分の怠惰が他人に迷惑をかけているという意識がありません。
正義感と責任感は、一人前の大人として認められるための最低条件でしょう。

しかし、これらは、「確固たる自己」が形成された結果として、自然に生じるべきものです。
「自己」がなく、正義感や責任感だけが強い人は、ただ「堅苦しい人」と思われるだけで、
かえってまわりからうとまれ、また自分自身も苦しむことになってしまいます。

自分に自信のない人が、やみくもに正義感や責任感で自分を縛りつけるということは、
よくあります。

自己をもたない人にとって、正義感や責任感とは、「他人から批判されないための防具」であり、
また、「他人を批判するための武器」なのです。

自分は、会社で与えられた仕事を責任をもってこなしているのに、まったく報われない。
母親として、妻としての努めをきっちり果たしているのに、夫は評価してくれない。
責任感の強い人ほど、激しいストレスに悩まされてしまいます。
何をするにも、自分から進んでしているのではなく、
「やらされている」という意識しかないのです。

もちろん、自分に与えられた責任を果たすことは、それだけをとり上げて考えれば、
けっして間違ってはいません。絶対に正しいことです。
しかし、理屈では正しいことだからこそ、始末が悪いのです。

「自分は間違っていないのに、なぜ報われないのか」という被害者意識、
他人への怒りに悩まされてしまいます。

そこで、原点に立ち返り、「何のための責任感か」ということを考え直す必要があります。
責任感それ自体は正しいことなのですから、改めることはありません。
しかし、責任感とは、「自分自身への誇り」の自然な結果として生じるものなのです。
あくまで、心豊かに生きるためのものです。

自分の不安をごまかすためのものでも、他人を批判するためのものでもありません。
自分にとっても社会全体にとっても有益であるから、責任感というものは存在するはずです。
責任感がかえって自分を苦しめるなら、やはりその動機が間違っています。

自らの意志で責任感を「もつ」のではなく、「もたされている」という意識しかない人は、
結局、「自分だけが我慢している」という不満を抱いてしまいます。
はっきりとした自我に目覚め、自分に誇りをもっている人は、
むしろ正義感や責任感というものは、ことさらに意識することなく生きています。

責任感はしっかりと自分の中にとけ込んでいるので、
「我慢している」などという意識はさらさらないのです。
[PR]
# by mihaela_romania | 2010-09-27 01:15 | 日々のつぶやき

吉野市について


白い花が霞のように山をおおう春には桜を求めて花見客が、
緑深まる夏には涼を求めて川遊びの客が、
四季を通じて興趣の尽きない自然を求め、
たくさんの人が私たちの町を訪れます。

四季折々の風情をみせる「吉野」の豊かな自然は、
歴史の舞台となり、文化を生み、私たちの暮らしを育んできました。

丁寧に育てられた吉野杉、吉野桧。色、香り、
木目の美しさは比類なきものであり、
加工された製品、また、その端材から生まれる割り箸は、
世界一と言っても過言ではないでしょう。
[PR]
# by mihaela_romania | 2010-09-26 21:39 | 日々のつぶやき